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CASE NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equal ProtectionAlaska Durational Residency Requirement
Held Unconstitutional
State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974).
Rayann Adams, a resident in the state of Alaska for a period of 3 continuous months, filed suit for divorce alleging that Alaska's 1-year residency
requirement for divorce actions' infringed on her fundamental rights of interstate travel, equal protection, and due process of law as guaranteed by the
United States and Alaska Constitutions. The Superior Court of the First Judicial District held that the statute violated the equal protection clauses of
the United States and Alaska Constitutions, and ordered that plaintiff be allowed to prove that she was a bona fide Alaskan domiciliary. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska. Held-Affirmed. Since all durational residency requirement statutes inherently infringe on the fundamental
right to interstate travel, they are prima facie invalid as violative of the 14th
amendment, and will be countenanced only where they serve a compelling
state interest. 2 Since no compelling state interest was served by maintenance
of the statute, Alaska's test of domicile will henceforth be a "subjective" one
wherein the proponent's actual state of mind rather than the time he has resided in the state will be determinative. 3
Within the confines of the Equal Protection Clause, states have the right
to classify persons for legitimate governmental purposes. 4 When a discriminatory classification is alleged, the United States Supreme Court has created
two tests for determining the statute's validity. Under the "traditional" or
"reasonable basis" test, a classification is void if it is without reasonable basis
and therefore purely arbitrary. 5 This less restrictive standard allows a classification to stand if any facts can be reasonably conceived to sustain it.6 A
much more precise test must be met where a classification infringes on a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right such as the right to vote 7 or the
1. ALAS. STAT. 09.55.140 (1973) provides: "Residence requirement for divorce.
No person may commence an action for divorce until he has been a resident of the
state for at least one year before the commencement of the action."
2. State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Alaska 1974).
3. Id. at 1132.
4. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). The court explained that states have a wide scope of discretion to classify persons under their police
power.,
5. Id. at 78-79; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
6. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 104 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
7. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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In such a case the statutes will be held unconstitutional

unless the classification is necessary to further some "compelling state inter-

est." 9 Once this requirement has been fulfilled, it must also be shown that
the statute is drawn with such precision as to constitute -the most minimal

restriction on the constitutional right in question. 10

State durational residency requirement statutes automatically divide residents into two classifications: old and new." Whether the reasonable basis

or the compelling state interest test is to be applied when a discriminatory
classification is alleged depends on the nature of the right affected by the

classification.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,' 2 the Supreme Court found that residency re-

requirements as a prerequisite to receiving welfare constituted a restriction on

interstate travel. 3 This right, though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, has nevertheless been held to be a fundamental one not to be denied
any person absent a showing of compelling state interest.' 4 Since the state
interests were not sufficiently compelling, the statutes were held unconstitutional. 1
I In 1972 the Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein 6 greatly
expanded the
17
scope of Shapiro.
A new Tennessee resident successfully attacked the
state's residence requirement which precluded him from voting in state elec8. See Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
9. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); see Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
10. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); see McLaughlin v. Florida,' 379
U.S. 184, 192-94 (1964). For a general discussion of both the traditional and strict
scrutiny tests see Comment, State DurationalResidence Requirements for Divorce: How
Long Is Too Long?, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 360-61 (1974); Note, Family
Law-The Constitutionality of State Durational Residence Requirements for Divorce, 51
TEXAS L. REv. 585, 588-89 (1973).
11. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972).
12. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
13. The court dealt with the District of Columbia and other state statutes: e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2c (Supp. 1974-75); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1967).
14. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Courts generally agree that
the right to interstate travel is a fundamental one. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757-59 (1966) held that "freedom to travel throughout the United States has long
been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution." Id. at 758; accord, Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-17 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125
(1958). See generally Comment, Travel: The Evolution of a Penumbral Right, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 84 (1973).
15. Shapiro v. Thompson,' 394 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1969). Proposed state interests
were found by the Court not to be compelling. The state contended, for example, that
residency requirements deterred indigents from migrating into the state and that they
limited welfare benefits. Id. at 633-38.*
16. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
17. Where Shapiro confined itself to the constitutionality of welfare statutes, Dunn
suggests that all.residency requirement statutes are Violative of equal protection. Comment State Durational Residence Requirements for Divorce: How Long Is Too Long?,
31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 363-65 (1974).
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tions' 8 as being restrictive of interstate travel. The state contended that a
proper reading of Shapiro showed that the compelling state interest ,test
should be activated only where the goal of the residency statute is to penalize
interstate travel. Justice Marshall, writing for -the majority, disagreed, suggesting that since the right to travel is unconditional, strict scrutiny should
be triggered whenever the right to travel is penalized, rather than only when
the restrictions are imposed intentionally on the migrant. 19
Durational residency statutes for divorce have been passed by state legislatures for a number of reasons, the primary one being to prevent their state
courts from becoming the battleground for "forum shoppers" who fraudulently assert domiciliary intent in order to obtain "quickie" divorces. 20 After
Shapiro, newly arrived divorce litigants began challenging the constitutionality of -these residency requirements. Because Dunn has -been assumed to
be authority on this question, several jurisdictions 'have held that divorce residency statutes penalize interstate travel, and as such are subject to strict scru2
tiny. '
A three-judge district court in Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lwn 22 found
Hawaii's 1-year residency statute 23 violative of the 14th amendment. Unnecessary discrimination against newly arrived individuals honestly intending to
establish Hawaiian domicile, coupled with the resultant infringement on inter18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-304 (1971).
19. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340-41 (1972). An opposite decision was
reached several months prior to Dunn in Whitehead v. Whitehead, 492 P.2d 939 (Ha-

waii 1972). There Hawaii's divorce statute was upheld after application of the reasonable basis test. The court held that the purpose of a residency statute for divorce is
not to deter interstate travel, but to insure proper establishment of domicile. Since it
is improbable that a person would be deterred from moving to another state simply because he could not get an immediate divorce there, interference with the right of travel
by a residency statute was seen to be too unlikely for the compelling state interest test
to be actuated. Id. at 944-45. This statute was later invalidated in Mon Chi Heung
Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973).
20. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Iowa 1973); Mon Chi
Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219, 222 (D. Hawaii 1973); Whitehead v. Whitehead,
492 P.2d 939, 943 (Hawaii 1972). See generally Note, Family Law-The Constitutionality of State Durational Residence Requirements for Divorce, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 585,
592-93 (1973).
Other stated reasons are to preserve marriages and further chances for reconciliation,
to ensure fairness to absent spouses and third parties, to preserve the integrity of the
state's decrees, and to give the family court ample time to gather information about
children who may be involved. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D.
Iowa 1973); Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219, 221 (D. Hawaii 1973);
Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (E.D. Wis. 1971). See generally
Comment, State Durational Residence Requirements for Divorce: How Long Is Too
Long?, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 381 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305, 306 (D.R.I. 1973); Mon Chi
Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219, 221 (D. Hawaii 1973); Fiorentino v. Probate
Court, 310 N.E.2d 112, 117 (Mass. 1974)..
22. 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973).
23. HAwAII 'REV. STAT. § 580-1 (1968).
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state migration, necessitated application of the compelling state interest test. 24

Although Hawaii's interest in preventing fraudulent assertions of domicile by
"forum shoppers" was judged to be clearly compelling, the statute was nevertheless held unconstitutional. 25 The court found that the language of the statute was imprecisely tailored, and therefore did not constitute the least restric26
tive method for promoting state interests.
Disagreement over residency requirement divorce statutes apparently
arises not from the type of test to be applied, but rather from divergent interpretations of the compelling state interest standard.27 Iowa's residence requirement 28 was upheld through a partial application of the compelling state
interest test in Sosna v. Iowa.29 Having found that the prevention of fraudu-

lent domicile is a significant state interest, the Iowa court completely disregarded that part of the strict scrutiny test requiring that the statute must be
so carefully drawn that it represents the least restrictive means for furthering

that interest. 30 Thus, although the courts in both Sosna and Mon Chi Heung

Au found compelling state interests in maintaining their respective durational
residency requirements, they reached opposite results.
Constitutional attacks on residency requirements for divorce have not been

limited to alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause. 8 1 A new avenue
of approach to the 14th amendment issue was opened in 1971 with the Su2
preme Court's ruling in Boddie v .Connecticut.3
The Court held that a statute requiring that certain filing fees be paid before divorce proceedings could
be instituted 33 deprived indigents of due process by unreasonably denying
24. Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219, 222 (D. Hawaii 1973).
25. Id. at 222.
26. Id. at 222. The court faithfully applied the second half of the compelling state
interest test as suggested in Dunn. The language of the statute was overbroad, and thus
restricted the rights of valid domiciliaries. The statute was also held invalid because
the court, citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), held that it raised an impermissible presumption that domicile could not be established in less than a year's time.
Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219, 222 (D. Hawaii 1973).
27. In Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973), Florida's 6-month
residence statute for divorce was upheld. The court found the 6-month requirement to
be such a negligible restriction of interstate travel that the statute should be maintained.
A less strict version of the compelling interest test was applied because its application
was tempered by considerations of convenience. Id. at 1235; see Comment, State Durational Residence Requirements for Divorce: How Long Is Too Long?, 31 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 359, 373-75 (1974).
28. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.6 (Supp. 1974-75).

29. 360 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 n.8 (N.D. Iowa 1973). The court contended that the
duration of a residence requirement is of minimal import and thus ignored the precision
test suggested in Dunn.
30. Id. at 1185 (McManus, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge McManus in his dissent
called the test which was applied an unidentified one, less stringent than the strict scrutiny test.
31. See Comment, State Durational Residence Requirements for Divorce: How
Long Is Too Long?, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 375 (1974).

32. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
33.

CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §

52-261 (1960).
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them access to the Connecticut divorce courts. 8 4

Efforts have been made to extend the reasoning of Boddie to apply in cases
where persons have been prevented by residency requirements from initiating
divorce actions.3 5 In Wymelenberg v. Syman, 3 a federal district court held
that if the state has seen fit to preempt the means for dissolving the marital
relationship by permitting divorce only through its courts, it may, then, limit
access to its divorce courts only where there are "countervailing interests of
overriding significance."37 The court concluded -that whether judged by the
"equal protection compelling interest standard" or by the "due process countervailing interest of overriding significance formula," the Wisconsin divorce
39

residency requirement38 was unconstitutional.
When a durational residency requirement for divorce is examined in the
light of the Equal Protection Clause, it is clear that a new resident is penalized simply for his decision to travel from one state to another. Examining
the same statute in the light of the Due Process Clause, a new resident's right
to be heard in state divorce courts is also restricted. Thus, whether the issue
is viewed as an equal protection or as a due process question, the fact remains
that a fundamental right is being violated by a discriminatory classification.
An analogous line of reasoning led the Alaska Supreme Court in State v.
Adams 40 to find the state's residency requirement statute inherently violative
of fundamental constitutional rights, and consequently subject to the strict
scrutiny required by the compelling state interest test.41 The opinion's discussion of the state interests involved in retaining the 1-year residence statute
represents a careful application of the strict standard as suggested by Dunn
34. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971).
35. Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973); Wymelenberg v. Syman,
328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971). Contra, Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp.
219, 220 n.3 (D. Hawaii 1973) (Boddie did not apply to divorce residency requirements
because the prohibition declared invalid in Boddie represented a total denial of access
to the divorce courts, whereas residency laws represent only a limited denial); Whitehead v. Whitehead, 492 P.2d 939, 947 (Hawaii 1972) (denied application of Boddie reasoning that divorce residency requirements are substantive, not procedural, and failure
to satisfy them does not deny access to the courts).
36. 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
37. Id. at 1356, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
38. WIs. STAT. § 247.05(3) (1974-75). This statute called for a 2-year residence
prior to filing suit for divorce.
39. A similar line of reasoning led the court in Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp.
305, 308-309 (D.R.I. 1973), to strike down Rhode Island's 2-year residence requirement
for divorce. The court found that the statute violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th amendment and opted to apply the equal protection compelling
interest test. Id. at 308-309.
40. 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974).
41. The Alaska court found the decisions in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973); and Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971) to be persuasive. State v. Adams,
522 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Alaska 1974).
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v. Blumstein.4 2
The state's first contention was that the statute served to protect the basic
family unit.4 Although it must be acknowledged that there is a strong public
interest in preserving the marital relationship and in guaranteeing the welfare
of affected children, the residency requirement did nothing to further those
state interests. Only the marriages of those persons who 'had not resided in
the state for 1 year were protected, while nothing was done to preserve
the marriages of longtime residents. Furthermore, the statute did not purport
to distinguish between divorce actions where custody of children is an issue
and where it is not. Thus, even though protection of the basic family unit
is a real state interest, the statute did not effectuate that interest.
Turning next to the state's contention that residency requirements assure
the validity of state divorce decrees, it should be noted -that domicile on the
part of the complainant is an adequate minimum contact to satisfy due process, and to entitle a divorce decree to full faith and credit. 4 4 Since domicile
is established by actual physical presence in the state coupled with the intent
-to make that state one's home, a strong presumption of domicile arises merely
from physical presence. 45 It follows that Alaska's divorce decrees would be
given full faith and credit even if domicile were established by a subjective
-test. Therefore, the need for a statute setting out an objective test of domicile to assure the validity of divorce rulings is hardly compelling.
Even if Alaska's residency statute could be viewed as promoting a compelling state interest, it has not done so within a narrow enough framework to
accomplish its goals without needlessly infringing on fundamental constitutional rights. For example, there was no showing by the state that its purported interests could not have been advanced (by a statute requiring a shorter
residency period.
When a state statute for objectively determining domicile is held unconstitutional, all tests of domicile, with the exception of the subjective test, are
eliminated. 46 This subjective test, which examines the complainant's state
of mind in order to establish domicile, is a more reasonable, less restrictive
alternative to the objective -test which does not penalize the fundamental right
of interstate travel. 47 The Alaska Supreme Court, however, has implemented this subjective test for domicile seemingly oblivious to the abuses and
42. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
43. State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Alaska 1974).
44. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1945) held that domicile
of one spouse within a given state gives that state the power to dissolve the marriage
wheresoever it was contracted.
45. See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 271 (1948).
46. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1972). A 6-month residency statute
will be just as invalid as a 1-year residency statute since even the slightest impairment
of interstate travel will activate the strict scrutiny test.
47. State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125, 1132 (Alaska 1974).
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difficulties the test invites. The primary problem, according to many courts,
is presented by forum shoppers who have been unable to institute divorce
proceedings in their home states. 48 They are attracted to sympathetic states
where no objective evidence of domicile is required and where a mere recital
of domiciliary intent, no matter how fraudulent, will establish domicile. State
courts fear that they may become divorce mills, grinding out one divorce after
another, each based on the amorphous concept of subjective domicile which
is likely to be fraudulently alleged. Courts also wish to avoid the possibility
49
of interfering with marriages not properly within their domain.
In addition, some argue that the subjective test will require a painstaking
case by case analysis of each divorce litigant's assertion of domicile.50 Since
such examinations of data indicating domiciliary intent will be too timeconsuming for divorce courts, their already great burden will be strained to
the breaking point.
. The Adams decision does not reflect a full appreciation of these problems.
In fact, the court completely ignores them. A subjective test of domicile,
however, could prove workable in Alaska, or in any state, if properly implemented. The fears of opening the doors of state courts to dishonest forum
shoppers and the resultant increase in litigation are greatly exaggerated.
Since domiciliary intent is not really that difficult an assertion to investigate,"
there is no reason why courts cannot handle divorce litigation both accurately
and efficiently. Surely courts which have proven themselves competent to
determine complicated matters of law are capable of correctly interpreting
questions of domicile.5 2 Such indications as whether the plaintiff has registered to vote, purchased a new home, or secured a permanent job should be
examined.53 There is no reason why this process cannot be proficiently accomplished. As Justice Marshall has written:
In most cases, it is no more difficult to determine whether one recently
arrived in the community has sufficient intent to remain to qualify as
48. Cases cited note 20 supra.
49. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Iowa 1973); Note, Family LawThe Constitutionality of State DurationalResidence Requirements for Divorce, 51 TExAs
L. REv. 585, 592 (1973).

50. Comment, State Durational Residence Requirements for Divorce: How. Long Is
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359, 381 (1974).
51. Note, The Problem of the "Newcomer's Divorce," 30 MD. L. REv. 367, 380
(1970).
52. Id. at 380.
53. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 55-56 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall suggests investigating to see if the claimant has bought a new home, registered
a car, obtained a driver's license, entered his child in school, or secured a permanent
job. Id. at 55-56. C. Clinton Clad has suggested investigation of the litigant's former
domicile to see if he has published a notice of change of residence, sold a cemetery lot,
canceled his checking accounts, or resigned club memberships. Note, The Problem of
the "Newcomer's Divorce," 30 MD. L. REv. 367, 380 n.113, citing C. CLAD, FAMILY LAW
136-38 (1958).
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